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STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF FOUR
RECENT AMERICAN
EXECUTIONS
SAM G. MCFARLAND*
The issue of whether capital punishment deters murder is still unresolved. Until 1975, the available research led to the conclusion that
there was no substantial evidence of a deterrent effect.'

The data sup-

porting this conclusion were generally: (1) comparisons of homicide
rates between states or nations with and without the death penalty, 2 (2)

analyses of changes in homicide rates associated with the aboliton or
installment of capital punishment, 3 (3) comparisons of homicide rates
between states with relatively high rates of execution and those with

relatively low rates of execution, 4 or (4) comparisons of homicide rates
for different social groups (e.g., blacks, women, white men) and their
correlation with the rates of executions within those groups.5

The appearance of Isaac Ehrlich's first study in 1975 revived the
plausibility of deterrence. 6 Using an econometrics model to predict the
"supply" of homicides, Ehrlich reported a significant elasticity in the
homicide rate associated with the probability of murderers being exe* Professor of Psychology, Western Kentucky University; Ph.D., Vanderbilt University,
1971; B.D., Vanderbilt University, 1967; M.A., Abilene Christian College, 1963; B.A., David
Lipscomb College, 1961. This study was funded in part by a grant from the Society for the
Psychological Study of Social Issues.
I W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA (1974).
2 T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959); Sellin, Death and Imprisonment as Deterrents to
Murder, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY (H. Bedau ed. 1964).
3 Hayner & Cranor, The Death Penalty in Washington State, 284 ANNALS 101 (1952); Samuelson, Why was CapitalPunishment Restored in Delaware?, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 148 (1969).
4 Forst, The Deterrent E ect of CapitalPunishment.: A Cross-StateAnalysis of the 1960's, MINN.
L. REV. 743 (1977); Schuessler, The Deterrent Inflaence of the Death Penalty, 284 ANNALS 54
(1952).
5 Schuessler, supra note 4.
6 Ehrlich, The Deterrent Eject of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM.
ECON. REV. 397 (1975).
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cuted following their convictions. He concluded that "an additional execution per year over the period in question (1933-1969) may have
resulted, on average, in seven to eight fewer murders."'7 A second study
by Ehrlich based on cross-sectional state data for the two years of 1940
and 1950 led him to a similar conclusion. 8 At about the same time, a
study by Yunker examining the correlation between the number of executions per year and the homicide rate three years later led to the even
stronger conclusion that each execution deters 156 murders. 9
These studies have been reviewed often and thoroughly. Various
authors have shown that the findings may be an artifact of the statistical
procedures used or the specific characteristics of the time intervals selected for study. In addition, the studies have been criticized for their
failure to include particular control variables which could account for
the observed deterrence, and their treatment of data in aggregate rather
than by state or region.' 0 Since these criticisms are well reported, there
is no need to detail them again. It is sufficient to say that the studies by
Ehrlich and Yunker do not conclusively verify the deterrent effect of the
death penalty.
Several recent studies using econometric models have tried to correct the flaws of the Ehrlich studies." None of these studies found significant elasticity coefficients for capital punishment as a predictor of
homicide rates, even though they employed a number of different measures of execution and homicide rates. Taken together, the econometric
studies do not provide unequivocal evidence of deterrence.
Two other lines of research, however, have recently yielded results
consistent with the deterrence hypothesis. Lester has shown that the likelihood of a decrease in homicides in a given state from one year to the
next is statistically related to whether that state executed prisoners during the first year.12 This likelihood is also related to the number of ex7 Id. at 414.

8 Ehrlich, CapitalPunishmentand Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts andAdditionalEvidence, 85

J. POL.

ECON. 741 (1977).
9 Yunker, Is the Death Penalty a Deterrent to Homicide: Some Time-Series Evidence, 1 J. BEHAV.
ECON. 45 (1976).
10 Baldus & Cole, A Comparisonof the Work of Thorsten Sllen and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent
E.fect of CapitalPunishment, 85 YALE LJ.170 (1975); Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence
in IsaacEhrlichsResearch on CapitalPunishment,85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975); Klein, Forst & Filatov,
The Deterrent Ee~ct of CapitalPunishment: An Assessment of the Estimates, in DERRENC
E
AND
INCAPACITATION:

ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCrIONS

ON CRIMINAL

RATES 336 (1978); Passell, The Deterrent Eject othe DeathPenalty: A StatisticalTest, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 61, 66 (1975).
11 Black & Orsagh, New Evidence on the Efjacy o/Sanctionsas a Deterrentto Homidde, 58 Soc.
Sci. Q. 616 (1978); Kleck, Capitalunishment,Gun Ownership, and Homicide, 84 AM. J. Soc. 882
(1979); Comment, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Temporal Cross-SectionalApproach, 70 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 235 (1979).
12 Lester, Executions as a Deterrent to Homicides, 44 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 562 (1979).
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ecutions in the state the first year, with nine to sixteen executions
producing a significantly greater likelihood of a drop in the number of
homicides (69% likelihood) than eight or fewer executions (52% likelihood). With more than sixteen executions in a state in a given year,
however, the likelihood of a drop in homicides the following year is only
61%, which is not significantly different from either of the other two
percentages. 13
One can envision third-variable causes which might undermine a
deterrence interpretation of Lester's data. For example, the declining
execution rate for the nation as a whole in the 1950's and 1960's was
coupled with rising murder rates. The growing murder rates, however,
can be attributed to the rising percentage of fifteen to twenty-four yearolds in the general population, 14 the declining rates of imprisonment for
homicide, 15 and the increases in handgun ownership.1 6 This alternate
interpretation appears unlikely, however, since Lester reports the same
deterrence pattern when comparisons are made across states within individual years. 17 Unless other variables are identified which can account
for Lester's results, his simple studies must be taken as offering substantial evidence of a deterrent effect. In addition, Lester's findings suggest
a particular pattern of deterrence: the deterrent impact of a particular
execution is local to the state of its occurrence and lasts for approximately one year.
A second approach has yielded evidence of a different kind of pattern of deterrence. Phillips, starting with the assumption that deterrence should be strongest in the weeks immediately following an
execution, analyzed the weekly homicide statistics for London, England
before and after twenty-two highly publicized executions from the years
1858 through 1921. He found that the homicide rate declined by about
35% for each of the two weeks following these executions. He also found
that the more extensive the newspaper accounts of an execution, the
greater the drop in homicides. In the third through the fifth weeks following the executions, however, the homicide rates rebounded above the
original baselines, virtually cancelling the deterrent effects of the two
previous weeks. Following the fifth week, the homicide rates returned to
their baselines.18
13 Lester, DeterringEffect ofExecutions on Murder as a Functionof Number and Proportionof Executions, 45 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 598 (1979).
14 Clinton & Spielberger, Is Delinquency Increasing? Age Structure and the Crime Rate, 49 SOC.
FORCES 493 (1971).

15 Forst, supra note 4, at 762.
16 Kleck, supra note 11, at 908.
17 Lester, supra note 12.
18 Phillips, The Deterrent Efect of CapitalPunishment: New Evidence on an Old Controversy, 86
AM. J. Soc. 139 (1980).
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At least three other studies prior to Phillips looked for short-term
deterrence in the weeks following executions, but none found evidence
of either the deterrent or the rebound effect. 1 9 These failures may be
due to the small scale of the studies, which could have prevented the
verification of weak but real effects. Dann 20 and Savitz 2 ' restricted their
22
analyses to homicide rates for the city of Philadelphia. Graves compiled homicide rates from the three largest counties in California.
Only one small effort has examined the short-term deterrent effect
of American executions for the nation as a whole. Using a chi-square
analysis, Lester found that the number of homicides for the two weeks
following Gary Gilmore's execution in 1977 dropped more than for a
comparable two-week period from the preceding year, but the difference

was only marginally significant.23 This same decline is analyzed with
24
different methods and discussed in detail in the present paper.
Apart from Lester's brief study, no major effort has been made to
verify or disprove the existence of a short-term deterrent effect for capital punishment in the United States. As Phillips notes,2 5 American data
are more likely than British findings to significantly affect American
opinion and policy on capital punishment. For a variety of reasons, a
pattern of deterrence found in England might not generalize to the
United States. English retribution for murder during the period of Phillips' study was much swifter than it currently is in the United States.
Executions were more certain to follow conviction and sentencing; appeals and prolonged delays were much rarer. In addition, the English
newspapers often described the trials and executions in gruesome detail.
Furthermore, England is a much more compact country than the
19 Graves reports trends which suggested both a two-day decrease in homicides immediately following each California execution and a two-day increase in homicides (a "brutalizing
effect") just before each execution. Graves, A Doctor Looks at CapitalPunishment, 10 J. LoMA
LINDA SCH. MED. 137 (1956), reprintedin THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: AN ANTHOL-

OGY (H. Bedau ed. 1964). These trends represent comparisons of the days of 74 weeks in
which there were executions with the days of 116 control weeks in which there were no executions. Unfortunately, however, Graves did not report any tests for the significance of these
trends. Chi-square analyses by the present author found that neither the deterrent effect,
x 2(l) = 2.08, p < .10, nor the brutalizing effect, x 2 (l) = 2.49, p < .10, were significant.
20 Dann, The Deterrent Efect of Capital Punishment, FRIENDS SOC. SCI. SERIEs (Bull. 29)
(1935).
21 Savitz, A Study in CapitalPunishment,49 J. GRIM. L., CRIMINOLO>GY & POLICE Sm. 338
(1958).
22 Graves, supra note 19.
23 Lester, Eect of Gag Gilmore's Execution on Homicidal Behavior, 47 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP.
1262 (1980).
24 See infra text accompanying notes 36-50.
25 Phillips, supra note 18, at 147.
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United States, so any execution was necessarily close to home.2 6 The
present study is an examination of whether or not the deterrent and
rebound effects reported by Phillips also occur for executions in the
United States, either on a national or local level.
Weekly homicide rates have only been available in the United
States since 1972.27 A standard system for recording deaths, the International Classification of Deaths Code, 28 is now used by the National
Center for Health Statistics and by all of the Bureaus of Vital Statistics
of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. Since these sources have
been available, seven executions have occurred in the United States:
Gary Gilmore (January 17, 1977 in Utah), John Spenkelink (May 25,
1979 in Florida), Jesse Bishop (October 22, 1979 in Nevada), Steven
Judy (March 9, 1981 in Indiana), Frank Coppola (August 10, 1982 in
Virginia), Charles Brooks (December 18, 1982 in Texas), and John
Lewis Evans (April 22, 1983 in Alabama). The present study covers the
first four of these executions; the last three occurred while this paper was
in preparation, so the homicide rates surrounding them were not
29
available.
Each of the executions covered in the present study received extensive news coverage, although the amount of coverage decreased substantially with each successive execution. Gilmore's execution was a major
media event, since his was the first in more than a decade. In the ten
weeks preceding the execution, the three major television networks averaged over twenty-seven minutes of total air-time on Gilmore.30 On the
day of the execution, it was the lead news story on all three networks,
31
receiving an average of seven minutes and ten seconds per network.
Newsweek devoted twenty column inches to the execution; 32 Time spent
33
thirty-eight inches covering it.
26 Consistent with Lester's findings, the proximity of the executions may have enhanced
the deterrent impact.
27 The FBI Uniform Crime Statistics, the older and more commonly used source of homicide rates, reports crime frequencies in only monthly intervals. This time interval makes the
Uniform Crime Statistics unusable for the present study.
28 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,

I MANUAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL

(9th ed. 1977). The definition of homicide used in this code includes all felonious homicides (code numbers E960-969).
Non- felonious homicides (e.g., police shootings of fleeing felons, etc.) were not included.
29 Homicide rates are first compiled by the Registrars of Vital Statistics of the individual
states and the District of Columbia and forwarded to the National Center for Health Statistics. Homicide records are generally not available from the individual states for six months to
a year following a particular execution. The national homicide records for any given year are
not available from the National Center for approximately three years following that year.
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES, INJURIES, AND CAUSES OF DEATH

30 VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, TELEVISION NEWS INDEX AND ABSTRACTS (1976, 1977).

31 Id.
32 Gilmore Gets His Wish, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 31, 1977, at 31.

33 After Gilmore, Who's Next to Die?, TIME, Jan. 31, 1977, at 48.
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The coverage of the subsequent executions decreased substantially.
The networks averaged four minutes and forty seconds of coverage on
the day of Spenkelink's execution, two minutes on Bishop's, and one
minute on Judy's. 34 The declines in network and news magazine coverage preceding the executions parallel these figures. 35 Still, each execution was a major news event, a condition which Phillips' findings suggest
is necessary for a substantial deterrent effect to occur.
Since weekly homicide rates are available from 1972 to the present,
it is possible to use Box-Jenkins ARIMA modeling for the data analyses.3 6 The advantages of this procedure over the nonparametric procedures used by Phillips are that one can examine time-series data for nonstationarity, 3 7 autoregressive processes, 38 and moving-average
processes. 39 Seasonal or annual changes in the data due to nonstationarity, autoregression, and moving-average processes can also be identified. In a sequential process, ARIMA modeling allows one to identify
which of these sources of systematic variance are contained in the timeseries data set, to calculate a parameter which estimates the strength of
each source of variance, and to use these parameters in predicting particular data-points within the series. Confidence boundaries can be calculated for each prediction. One can then examine whether the
40
observed data-points deviate significantly from their predictions.
ARIMA modeling of the homicide data in the present arrays revealed significant autoregressive, moving-average, and seasonal
autoregressive parameters, an ARIMA (1,0,1) (1,0,0) model. Tests of
the adequacy of this model showed that the arrays contained no other
systematic sources of variance.
34 VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, TELEVISION NEWS INDEX AND ABSTRACTS (1979, 1981).

35 For example, Newsweek gave only nine column inches to the execution of Mr. Spenkelink, Electric Chair is Turned On, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1979, at 26, and did not report the last
two executions at all.
36 See generally Box & Jenkins, TIME-SERIES

ANALYSIS: FORECASTING AND CONTROL

(1976). Homicide rates through 1976 were available at the time of this study. The National
Center for Health Statistics supplied homicide rates for 1977 and 1978. I requested homicide
rates for 1979 and 1981 from the Registrars of Vital Statistics of each state and the District of
Columbia, receiving for 1979 statistics from 46 of the states and the District of Columbia,
representing 95% of the population, and, for 1981, statistics from 41 states and the District of
Columbia, representing 84% of the population. While the failure to obtain complete homicide rates surrounding the last three executions is regrettable, these data are sufficient to
discern the deterrent and rebound effects of the executions, if any.
37 Non-stationarity is a linear increase or decrease in the rates from the beginning to the
end of the time period.
38 An auto-regressive process is a pattern of systematic increase and decreases in the observed frequencies over a range of sequential observations.
39 A moving-average process is a "random shock" effect, a tendency for one observation to
impact upon the immediately following observation.
40 A brief introduction to ARIMA modeling can be found in Cook & Cambell, QUASIEXPERIMENTATION:

DESIGN AND ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETINGS (1979).
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Figure 1 presents the predicted national homicide rates from the
ARIMA model, the lower 95% confidence boundary of the predicted
rates,4 1 and the actual number of homicides for each of the five weeks
preceding and each of the eight weeks following the execution of Gary
Gilmore. Figures 2 through 4 present the same information for the
weeks surrounding each of the other three executions. In each of the
two weeks following Gilmore's execution, the number of homicides was
significantly lower than predicted by the ARIMA model, p < .05 for
each week. None of the other eleven weeks presented in Figure 1
showed a similar lower-than-predicted homicide rate. The third
through the fifth weeks following the execution, however, give no evidence of a systematic increase in homicides as was reported by Phillips
for the London data.4 2 Moreover, Figures 2 through 4 indicate that the
43
other three executions had no discernible effect on homicide rates.
On the surface, the interpretation most consistent with Phillips' results is that the Gilmore execution had a deterrent effect on homicides
because of its massive publicity, while the lower publicity given to the
remaining executions prevented them from having such an effect. However, a closer examination of the Gilmore execution suggests an alternate explanation. Gilmore's execution occurred on January 17, 1977,
and coincided almost exactly with the onset of one of the worst blizzards
ever to hit the eastern United States. Snow fell as far south as Georgia
and Alabama and temperatures for this two-week period plunged far
below normal. Weather conditions in the industrial states were the
worst in years.44 The parameter for controlling seasonality in the
ARIMA model may not be sufficient to account for the impact of this
unusually bad weather on homicide rates. Without further analysis, one
41 A frequency which falls on or below this boundary can be attributed to a causal event
with 95% certainty and would occur by chance only 5 times in 100 occurrences.
42 The unusually high homicide rates during the last two weeks of December is not an
aberration. The homicide frequencies for each year covered by this study showed similar
spikes. During the 1970's, the last four weeks of December averaged, in order, 370, 408, 441,
and 428 homicides. In the first week of January, the average number of homicides returned
to 370. Murder, then, increases during the holidays.
43 The frequencies are such that the addition of the uncollected 5% of the national homicide data for 1979 and 16% of the data for 1981 would be very unlikely to produce either the
two-week declines or the three-week increases necessary to replicate Phillips' London findings.
44 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, DAILY WEATHER MAPS, (Jan. 1-31, 1977) [hereinafter
cited as DAILY WEATHER MAPS].
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could argue that the significant decline in homicides following the Gil45
more execution was weather related and not due to the execution.
These two possible effects on the homicide rates can be disentangled through the use of regional analyses. Thirteen western states had
normal temperatures and no unusual precipitation during this two-week
period. 46 On the other hand, the seventeen midwestern states were
atthe opposite extreme. 4 7 The midwestern states all averaged more than

twelve degrees below their normal temperatures and at least some snow
fell virtually every day. If the lower homicide rates are exclusively
weather related, the western states should not show a significant decline
in homicides during the critical two weeks while the midwestern states
should show the strongest decline.
Figure 5 shows the predicted homicide rates, their lower 95% confidence boundaries, and the actual number of homicides for each of the
weeks surrounding the Gilmore execution for the normal-weather western states. Figure 6 presents the same information for the frozen midwestern states. As Figure 5 shows, the homicide rates for the western
states did not differ significantly from the predicted rates for either of
the two weeks following the Gilmore execution. Figure 6, however,
shows a sharp decline in murders in the midwestern states for the week
following the execution, the same week the blizzard hit.
A remaining puzzle is that the national pattern (Figure 1) shows a
sharp decline in homicides during the week of January twenty-fourth,
the second week following the Gilmore execution, but this pattern is not
found for either the western states (Figure 5) or the midwestern states
(Figure 6). Figures 7 and 8 show that this decline occurred primarily in
the northeast 48 and in the southeast. 4 9 Once again, this pattern appears
to be weather related. The worst weather of January, 1977 in both the
45 There are surprisingly few studies on the influence of weather on violent crime apart
from those studies on seasonal patterns. Violent crimes of all types are highest during the

summer months and lowest during the winter. Cf. Harries, CRIME AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(1980). However, the few studies of the effects of short-term weather fluctuations upon violent
crime which have been reported support the common-sense assumption that inclement
weather and low temperatures result in lower rates of violent crime, including homicides. Cf.
Feldman, FactorsInflencing CriminalBehavior in Newark, N.J.: A Local Study in ForensicPychiatq,
24 J. FORENSIC Sci. 234 (1979).
46 The western states included in this analysis are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
47 The midwestern states included in this analysis are Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
48 The northeastern states included in this analysis are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
49 The southeastern states included in this analysis are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas.
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FIGURE 5
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northeast and the southeast occurred during the week of January
twenty-fourth. In the northeast, substantial snow fell on only two days
during the week of January seventeenth, while it fell on five days during
the week of January twenty-fourth. In the southeast, substantial precipitation (a mixture of rain and snow) fell on one day during the week of
January seventeenth, and on five days during the week of January
twenty-fourth. 50 As the severe weather moved further south and east,
the drop in homicides seems to have followed. The most plausible conclusion of this analysis is that the drop in homicides following the Gilmore execution was caused by the unusually severe winter weather
rather than by the execution.
Finally, the possibility of local deterrence should be examined.
Short-term deterrence and rebound may occur only in the state of the
execution and, perhaps, its contiguous states. This local effect may be
lost in the wash of national data. The local data, however, do not support this hypothesis. For example, Figure 9 plots the number of homicides in Florida and its bordering states for the weeks surrounding the
Spenkelink execution. No evidence of a decline or rebound is shown.
The comparable plots for the other three executions also show no declines or rebounds.
The failure to find local effects is hardly surprising since each of
these executions received national news coverage. When executions were
more common, as was the case during the period covered by Lester's
studies, most executions, no doubt, were reported only in local or statewide media. This limited reporting would of course prohibit a nationwide pattern of deterrence for a given execution. As long as executions
in the United States remain rare and each one is reported by the major
television networks and news magazines, a national pattern of deterrence is more likely than a local one.
50 DAILY WEATHER MAPS, supra note 44.
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In summary, the present study fails to find any evidence that capital punishment has either a short-term deterrent or a rebound effect on
homicides. If such effects do occur, they are too small for detection
given the available number of executions and the present mode of analysis. Considering the national data pool and the findings of the state
and regional analyses, however, it would be wishful thinking to imagine
that adding additional executions to the study would provide support
for the deterrence hypothesis. These findings do not mean, of course,
that deterrent and rebound effects may not occur at other times and in
other social circumstances. Nor do they disprove deterrence for capital
punishment in general or rule out other plausible patterns of deterrence.5 1 The present study does show, however, that the particular pattern of deterrence reported by Phillips does not occur here and now in
American society.
Many authors have concluded that the presence or absence of deterrence probably cannot be proved statistically.5 2 Certainly the
econometric studies and the older studies which look for evidence of deterrence without specifying particular patterns are so plagued with
problems that they are unlikely ever to resolve the debate. Those studies
which look for particular patterns of deterrence, however, do offer the
potential for resolution. If particular patterns of deterrence are replicated across different studies, one must conclude that the deterrence hypothesis is correct. On the other hand, if reliable and unequivocal
patterns are not shown, the deterrence hypothesis is undermined. With
about 1,100 inmates still under the sentence of death, and a resurgence
of popular support for capital punishment reported by the polls, the
issue remains vital. Human lives are in the balance either way. One
can only hope that social scientists will continue to give their best efforts
to the deterrence issue rather than retreating in despair.

51

The pattern of deterrence in the United States (if any) may be diffused across one year

or so as Lester's findings suggest, rather than concentrated into a shorter time span.
52 See, e.g., van den Haag, On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCL 141, 146 (1969).

